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THE ANTITRUST CONSEQUENCES OF
MANUFACTURER-SUGGESTED RETAIL




Contemporary marketing bristles with antitrust implications. One clus-
ter of marketing strategies involves the attempts of manufacturers to
control the distribution of their products. When successful, such efforts
impose constraints upon those who are placed "vertically" down the
distribution chain-wholesalers, jobbers, retail dealers, etc. I The range
of vertical control which may be used by a manufacturer includes control
over the territories within which its reselling dealers can operate, control
over the customers to whom its dealers are permitted to sell, control over
the range of its product line any particular dealer will (or must) carry,
control over what other competing products its dealers may also carry,
control over which individuals will be selected as dealers, and, of course,
control over the price at which its product will be resold. The techniques
by which such control is exercised will vary with the matter at hand. The
controls also will vary in formality from express agreements and under-
takings by the dealer to informal pressures and "persuasions" not com-
mitted to writing or even, for that matter, to words. 2
The courts have varied in their treatment of manufacturer efforts to
impose nonprice controls on product distribution. In 1963, the first
Supreme Court consideration of the question3 indicated that the Court
would appraise vertical nonprice constraints under the rule of reason,
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.S., 1954, University of Denver; L.L.B.,
1956, University of Denver, L.L.M., 1958, Yale Law School.
1. To simplify the discussion in this article it will be assumed that the distribution system in-
volves only two tiers--the manufacturer and the retail dealer. The central concern of this article is
suggested retail prices, a part of the broader theoretical area of suggested resale prices.
2. For a general discussion of the techniques of vertical control in distribution, with special ref-
erences to price controls, see B. YAMEY, THE ECONOMICS OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE (1954); Bow-
man, The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 825 (1955);
Keck, Alternative Distribution Techniques-Franchising, Consignment, Agency, and Licensing, 13
AN'rmusr BuLL. 177 (1968); Tester, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J. LAW &
EcoN. 86 (1960).
3. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
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rather than condemn them as per se offenses. 4 Counseling, advocacy and
decisionmaking proceeded therefore through an evaluation of the harms
and benefits of an arrangement to determine if, on balance, the restraint
was unreasonable. 5 Four years later in United States v. Arnold, Schivinn
& Co.,6 the Court reversed its position and held that so long as the
manufacturer actually sold the product to the dealer, any efforts to con-
trol territories within which the dealer sold, or customers to whom he
sold, were per se offenses of the antitrust laws. The opinion was much
criticized 7 and only indifferently followed by lower courts. 8 In 1977, the
Court again reversed direction in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Syl-
vania, Inc.9 The Court indicated that the per se rule was too abrupt a way
of dealing with at least some nonprice restrictions. At present, commen-
tators and other courts are at work purifying the implications of
Sylvania. 10
The attitude of the courts toward vertical price restraints has been
more consistent. From the earliest decision in 19111" through the 1977
Sylvania opinion, the Court has regularly declared that vertical price
fixing is a per se offense. 12 Ignoring the ten years when Schwinn was in
full sway, it could be said that the courts have generally subjected verti-
cal nonprice restraints to rule of reason appraisal, but have condemned
vertical price restraints under the per se rule. Although this conclusion
appears to be consistent with the cited cases, it misdescribes the practical
effect of the doctrine. The criteria used to determine what constitutes
4. The conventional dichotomy between the presumptive illegality of the per se approach and
the more elaborate inquiry involved in the rule of reason approach is summarized in L. SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OF ANTITRUST 165-86 (1977). A short statement of the approaches as they are
applied to vertical restrictions may be found in Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of
Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1978).
5. See Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its After-
math, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1968).
6. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
7. See, e.g., Baker, Vertical Restraints in Times of Change: From White to Schwinn to
Where?, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 537 (1975); Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Reviewv-1967, 53
VA. L. REV. 1667 (1967); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Re-
stricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUMI. L. REV.
282 (1975); Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 243 (1975).
8. The cases are reviewed in Robinson, supra note 7, at 270-81.
9. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
10. Of special interest in the voluminous Sylvania literature are Louis, Vertical Distribution Re-
straints After Sylvania: A Postscript and Comments, 76 MICH. L. REV. 265 (1977), and Pitofsky,
supra note 4.
I1. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
12. Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the Court in Sylvania, conceded that some commentators
urged that vertical price and nonprice restrictions should be judged by the same criteria, but never-
theless explicitly retained the per se rule for price restrictions on the basis of long standing judicial




vertical price fixing are less stringent than the criteria used to character-
ize price-related conduct among horizontal competitors. As a result, a
substantial range of conduct which would clearly be regarded as price
fixing if the participants were horizontally related is regarded as some-
thing less than price fixing when the relationship is vertical. Much
vertical conduct affecting price thus is exempt from the per se rule, and
indeed, from antitrust scrutiny altogether.
A manufacturer's suggestion of resale prices to dealers is an example
of price-affecting conduct which is said to create no antitrust liability
despite the fact that liability would result from identical conduct if the
parties were horizontally related. This article argues that permitting par-
ties to tamper with the price term in any fashion risks contravention of
the policies behind the antitrust laws, and that making the antitrust conse-
quence turn on whether the parties appear to be related vertically or
horizontally is not an intelligible way of minimizing that risk. In conclu-
sion it is recommended that suggested prices should be presumptively
illegal. Because this recommendation is a significant departure from
prevailing doctrine, it will be helpful to note first the techniques by
which vertical conduct affects resale prices, and then to sketch the his-
tory of legal doctrine relating to that conduct.
II. THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF VERTICAL CONDUCT
AFFECTING PRICE
A. Manufacturer Conduct Affecting Resale Price
The manufacturer interested in affecting the resale price of its product
has a variety of ways to communicate its preference to dealers. The most
direct method is to negotiate a contract which obligates the dealer to
resell at a fixed price, or at least not to undercut a stated price. ' 3 Ordinar-
ily, such formal agreements are banned, 14 but the development of mar-
keting arrangements with a prospective dealer still provides ample oppor-
tunity for the manufacturer to express its preference as to resale price.
For example, a less direct but equally efficient means of transmitting
information to the dealer about the manufacturer's preference is through
catalogs and price lists. Often, such catalogs and lists will identify the
13. The basic concern of this article is manufacturer control of minimum dealer prices, since
this impedes vigorous dealer competition. Manufacturer control of maximum dealer prices presents
quite a different economic issue, although the courts have not distinguished between the two forms
of price control. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951);
L. SuLuvAN, supra note 4, at 210-12, 390-91.
14. See Part II-B infra.
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retail price of the product, with the dealer's price being calculated as a
percentage discount off the stated retail price. ' 5
Another common technique is for the manufacturer to aid the dealer in
dealer advertising in a manner which affects pricing. The manufacturer
may, for example, provide advertising displays, window cards, newspa-
per mats and other forms of advertising which picture or describe the pro-
duct and which include its retail price. Although a dealer who uses such
advertising is technically free to sell at a lower price, it is unlikely that a
dealer would do so; one would ordinarily advertise one's lowest price.
The manufacturer may make provision for some form of joint advertising
allowance to the dealer, conditioning the manufacturer's contributions
upon the dealer's refraining from advertising the product at a lower price
than the manufacturer has suggested. 16 A further variation is for the man-
ufacturer itself to advertise in local, regional, or national publications and
media, stating the retail price in such advertisements. Although such
manufacturer advertising is not conduct which directly involves the
dealer, it does serve as a channel through which manufacturer pricing
preferences are communicated to both dealers and consumers. Conceiv-
ably, through the use of trade publications, some price information can
be transmitted to the dealer by advertising or news stories without in-
forming the public.
Finally, manufacturers may include with or imprint on the product
some indication of its retail price. This may be part of the art work in
which the product is dressed and may be either inseparable from the
package or detachable. Detachment may be easy or difficult, noticeable
or not. The price information may also be part of the warranty or instruc-
tional material included with the product which cannot easily be removed
from the product.
In all of these transmissions, the price may be stated in clear and un-
ambiguous terms or it may be in a code only the dealer can read. The
price may be stated with varying degrees of precision, ranging from
15. There may be an independent need for such catalogs and lists-beyond their function as
transmission belts for manufacturer pricing preferences. With some product lines, for example, the
number of separate items to be priced or the complexity of their combinations may make it highly
useful to the retailer to have this information calculated and identified for him, quite apart from any
value that either the retailer or the manufacturer may perceive in the level of prices as such. Further,
there may be greater or lesser degrees of knowledge about whether all other retailers receive the
same catalogs and price lists, just as there will be variations in the extent to which consumers will
have access to these data.
16. See P.D.Q., Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 577 F.2d 910 (1978); The Advertising Checking
Bureau, Inc., 2 TRADE REG. RE'. (CCH) 21,540 (1979) (consent order).
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"About $9.95" or "Less than $10.00" to "Suggested Retail Price, $9.95"
or "Manufacturer's Suggested Retail Price, $9.95. '17
B. Legal Doctrine Surrounding Suggested Resale Prices
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits any "contract, combination
.... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade."'1 8 The following discussion
examines the two components of the statutory offense: that the defen-
dant's conduct must restrain trade in the statutory sense, and that there
must be some joint effort or "agreement."' 9
1. Conduct in restraint of trade
Some conduct is deemed so typically harmful to competition and so
devoid of credible benefits as to be presumed unlawful under section I
without any proof of the defendant's power or purpose, or without exten-
sive inquiry into the effects of the arrangement. Of these per se offenses,
price fixing is the clearest and most consistent example. Other conduct,
thought to be harmful to competition only under certain circumstances or
thought to involve substantial benefits, is said to be judged by a rule of
reason;20 such conduct is condemned only if an analysis of the defen-
dant's market power and purpose and the likely effect of the arrangement
shows that it will produce more harms than benefits.
The first vertical price fixing case to reach the Supreme Court, Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 21 was decided in 1911.'
17. This brief catalog of techniques inevitably suggests that the price information is flowing
down from the manufacturer to the dealer and that in turn suggests that it is the manufacturer's inter-
est which is being served by the transmission. Yet, it is not at all obvious why the manufacturer
should be interested in keeping up the retail price of his product. In theory, the manufacturer's price
to the dealer (and hence its profit on each unit) remains the same whatever price the dealer charges to
his customer. Since the lower the dealer's price, the greater quantity of the product is likely to be
sold, it would appear to be in the manufacturer's interest to encourage the reduction of retail prices in
order to maximize sales. The manufacturer, in short, should favor retail price cutting, not fight it,
because the lower the retailer's margin the greater the manufacturer's profits.
Two kinds of explanations have been given for the continuation of manufacturer efforts to control
retail prices in the face of the apparent economic harm done to manufacturers by increased retail
prices. One response is that the phenomenon is essentially retailer-inspired because "resale price
maintenance" serves retailer interests in reducing intrabrand competition. The other answer is that
there are in fact benefits to the manufacturer from the support of resale prices. Both of these re-
sponses will be examined after the legal setting has been described. See Part III infra.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
19. See Part fl-B infra. The classic consideration of the requirement of an agreement is Turner,
The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal,
75 HARv. L. REv. 655 (1962).
20. See generally L. Suwv~A, supra note 4, at 165-86.
21. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
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Dr. Miles was a manufacturer of patent medicines which were sold to
wholesale drug companies for distribution through retail drug stores. Dr.
Miles had formal contracts with over 400 wholesalers and 25,000 retail
dealers in the United States; the effect of these contracts was to fix the
retail price charged the consumer. In an action involving one of these
contracts, the circuit court ruled that the contracts were in restraint of
trade and void. The Supreme Court affirmed. The defendant had con-
tended that because it could sell or not as it chose, it could also attach any
conditions it pleased to the sale, including conditions under which its
buyer could resell. Justice Hughes, writing for the majority, rejected this
argument, and laid down what is still the basic law of vertical price re-
straints.
Three aspects of the Dr. Miles opinion are of special interest in this
analysis. First, in finding the contracts illegal, Hughes relied on the prin-
ciples of unlawful restraints on alienation which prohibit a manufacturer
from unduly restricting a buyer's selling options. The language of the
opinion shows its kinship with the restraints on alienation cases and the
principle that emerges is much like a rule of reason standard:
To sustain the restraint, it must be found reasonable both with respect to the
public and to the parties, and that it is limited to what is fairly necessary
.. for the protection of the covenantee .... The question is whether, un-
der the particular circumstances of the case and the nature of the particular
contract involved in it, the contract is or is not, unreasonable. 22
This restraint on alienation analysis suggests that one value Hughes saw
reflected in the Sherman Act was freedom for the dealer to make its own
pricing decisions without manufacturer interference.
Second, although the Court did not prohibit the contracts on the
ground that vertical price fixing was a per se offense, there is neverthe-
less a per se mood in the opinion. Hughes briskly and negatively charac-
terized the purpose of the arrangement as being "designed to maintain
prices... [of] the articles, and to prevent competition among those who
trade in them."12 3 He then dismissed asserted justifications based on the
character of the commodity, the degree of restriction, and the character
of prior ownership. 24 The recent Sylvania case shows that the Court con-
tinues to subject vertical price restraints to an especially intense antitrust
scrutiny.25
A third important aspect of the opinion is the recognition that horizon-
22. Id. at 406.
23. Id. at 407.
24. Id. at 408-09.




tal effects on competition may result from vertical price maintenance ar-
rangements. Hughes concluded that because the agreement had the effect
of preventing competition among retailers it should be judged on the
same basis as an agreement between horizontally related competitors; 26
the focus was thus on the effects rather than the asserted purpose when
the two did not coincide. The Court recognized that benefits might flow
from the vertical arrangement, but Hughes concluded that such benefits
accrued primarily to the retailer, 27 and that even if there were benefits to
the manufacturer, they could not be used to justify an arrangement which
foreclosed horizontal competition. He wrote that once the manufacturer
"sold its product at prices satisfactory to itself, the public [was] entitled
to whatever advantage may be derived from competition in the subse-
quent traffic." '28
Although Dr. Miles did not explicitly hold that vertical pacl€fixing
was a per se offense, that rule was quickly adopted once United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co.29 established a per se rule against horizontal price
fixing. In later cases, the Court said vertical price fixing was prohibited
by the Sherman Act regardless of the commodity involved,30 the market
power of the manufacturer, 31 and the existence of the significant benefits
26. 220 U.S. at 407-08. The court stated:
If there be an advantage to the manufacturer in the maintenance of fixed retail prices, the ques-
tion remains whether it is one which he is entitled to secure by agreements [of this sort] ....
As to this, the [manufacturer] can fare no better ... than could the dealers themselves if they
formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same restrictions ....
[Algreements or combinations between dealers, having for their sole purpose the.., fixing
of prices, are injurious to the public interest and void. They are not saved by the advantages
which the participants expect to derive ....
Id.
27. Id. at 407. Justice Hughes has been much criticized for the Dr. Miles opinion. It is said that
he was too abrupt in judging this kind of price fixing in that he failed to recognize that manufacturers
have legitimate interests in the control of resale prices. As has been indicated, however, Hughes did
not deny the existence of such benefits. He merely said they did not justify the conceded harms.
Perhaps closer to the mark, Hughes did not perceive what are today seen as the benefits to competi-
tion which are said to flow from some kinds of vertical restraints. He treated asserted benefits of the
restraints as windfalls to the manufacturer and hence not weighty in the antitrust calculus-
especially when balanced against the harms of eliminating intrabrand competition. Moreover, the
suggestion that Hughes was unusually hostile to price fixing seems difficult to square with the histor-
ical record. As counsel, he did, after all, represent the Colgate Company in the litigation which sub-
stantially limited Dr. Miles. He was counsel for Trenton Potteries in 1927, urging the Court (unsuc-
cessfully this time) to adopt the rule that reasonable price fixing was not a violation of the Sherman
Act. See note 29 and accompanying text infra. And when Hughes returned to the Court, it was he
who wrote the decision in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), which
permitted the application of a rule of reason to a form of price fixing. He was hardly a justice one
could accuse of being unsympathetic to the possible benefits of price fixing.
28. 220 U.S. at 409.
29. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 307 (1948).
31. See, e.g., United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
Washington Law Review
to the manufacturer, including those protected by patents and copy-
rights. 32 Resale price maintenance also was held to be an unfair method
of competition under the Federal Trade Commission Act. 33
2. Agreement between the parties
Because the arrangement in Dr. Miles involved an express agreement
between the manufacturer and the wholesalers and dealers, no issue was
raised about the second component of a Sherman Act offense: whether
there was a "contract, combination, or conspiracy." Nor did the Court
consider what conduct short of explicit price fixing should be included
within the ban. These issues, in strangely tangled form, arose a few years
later in United States v. Colgate & Co. 3 4
The case arose from a criminal indictment alleging that Colgate was
engaged in an unlawful conspiracy to fix resale prices. Colgate's alleg-
edly conspiratorial conduct included notifying its dealers about appropri-
ate resale prices, urging their adoption, threatening to cut off dealers who
did not cooperate, asking for information about dealers who were not
complying with the company's requests, and seeking assurances from
dealers that the suggestions would be complied with. 35 Today, these alle-
gations would be clear evidence of an "agreement." Nonetheless, in an
ambiguous interpretation of the indictment, the trial court had sustained
the defendant's demurrer. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that "as
interpreted below, the indictment does not charge Colgate ... with sell-
ing its products to dealers under agreements which obligated the latter
not to resell except at prices fixed by the company." 36
With the issue of agreement thus resolved, any liability would have to
have been predicated on Colgate's completely unilateral action in cutting
off dealers with whom it no longer chose to do business, a position nei-
ther court would accept. The trial court held that the manufacturer had an
"undoubted right to decline to further deal" 37 with customers who refused
to resell at the understood price. The Supreme Court agreed that liability
would not attach under these circumstances, and the following language
from its opinion has governed the law of suggested retail prices for sixty
years:
32. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at 377.
33. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
34. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
35. Id. at 303.
36. Id. at 307.
37. Id. at 305.
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In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act
does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or manufacturer en-
gaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own indepen-
dent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. 38
In exercising that "long recognized right," the manufacturer is free to
"announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to
sell."'39 Presumably, one of the permitted "circumstances" is a refusal by
the dealer to continue to charge the resale price suggested by the manu-
facturer.
The effect of Colgate, of course, is not directly to approve resale price
maintenance by manufacturers; by its terms the case only protects the
manufacturer's power to terminate dealers. The result nevertheless al-
lows the manufacturer to discipline dealers who do not comply with its
pricing preference. Hence, the case confers broad antitrust immunity on
much manufacturer conduct aimed at controlling resale prices. The Court
did not retreat openly from the policy against vertical price fixing an-
nounced in Dr. Miles.40 The Court instead reached this result by placing
a special emphasis on the technical element of "agreement." The opinion
implies that so long as the arrangement between the manufacturer and the
dealer does not impose a legal duty on the dealer to comply with the
manufacturer's pricing suggestions, there is no "agreement" within the
meaning of the Sherman Act; the manufacturer is free to impose the prac-
tical sanction of refusing to deal with those who do not follow the sug-
gested prices. 41
The Colgate Court distinguished Dr. Miles as a case Where an agree-
ment clearly existed. Consequently, future litigation had to plot out the
lines of permissible manufacturer conduct by judgments about whether
such conduct constituted an agreement or not. 42 When it became
apparent that manufacturer conduct falling well short of an agreement in
38. Id. at 307.
39. Id.
40. Dr. Miles was regarded as wholly different because the arrangement in that case "was ef-
fected through contracts which undertook to prevent dealers from freely exercising the right to sell."
Id. at 308.
41. The Court stated:
We cannot. . . wholly disregard the statement that "the retailer. . . could, if he chose, give
away his purchase, or sell it at any price he saw fit. ... We must conclude that . . . the
indictment does not charge Colgate... with selling its products to dealers under agreements
which obligated the latter not to resell except at prices fixed by the company.
Id. at 306-07.
42. It has been regretted that so critical a juncture of the law should have been decided by so
"unworthy" a case as Colgate. See Levi, The Parke, Davis-Colgate Doctrine: The Ban on Resale
Price Maintenance, 1960 Sup. CT. REy. 258, 285.
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any conventional sense nevertheless would threaten the values Dr. Miles
sought to promote, the Court had to choose whether to abandon the Dr.
Miles policy against vertical price fixing or to expand the concept of
agreement artificially. The Court chose the latter alternative with the re-
sult that liability now turns on "an imaginary inference [of agreement],
all askew from the normal meaning of [the term].'143
The doctrine developed in distinct stages. The Court first conceded
that the necessary agreement need not be express, but could be "implied
from a course of dealing or other circumstances. '44 Then, in FTC v.
Beech-Nut Packing Co., 45 the Court held that an "agreement" may be
found although it is not even implicit. Beech-Nut entered into negotia-
tions with dealers seeking assurances from them that they would comply
with the manufacturer's wishes. The Court found that such practices "are
quite as effectual as agreements express or implied intended to accom-
plish the same purpose." '46
The movement away from requiring some actual consensus between
the parties continued. Finally, in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,47
the Court so modified the "agreement" element that it now retains none
of its original consensual meaning. "Agreement" has become a code
word meaning only that the manufacturer has pursued its price prefer-
ences with an unacceptable vigor. The Parke, Davis Court explained:
[Colgate meant] no more than that a simple refusal to sell ... is permissi-
ble under the Sherman Act. In other words, an unlawful combination is not
just such as arises from a[n] .. .agreement, express or implied; such com-
bination is also organized if the producer secures adherence to his
suggested prices by means which go beyond his mere declination to sell to
a customer who will not observe his announced policy. 48
The practical effect of this line of cases is the subject of continuing
43. Id. at 294.
44. United States v. Shrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 99 (1919).
45. 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
46. Id. at 455.
47. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
48. Id. at 43. The Court was clear about the price paid for this freedom on the part of the manu-
facturer. The danger that horizontal competition would be affected was conceded: "True, there re-
sults the same economic effect as is accomplished by a prohibited combination to suppress price
competition if such customer, although induced to do so solely by a manufacturer's announced pol-
icy, independently decides to observe specified resale prices." Id. at 44. The Court further conceded
that manufacturer suggestions may, in fact, induce retailers to use the suggested price by giving them
some assurance that they will not be undercut by other retailers. "It must be admitted that a seller's
announcement that he will not deal with customers who do not observe his policy may tend to engen-




debate. 49 Many feel that the immunity Colgate conferred on a manufac-
turer has been wholly eliminated by the judicial willingness to find the
requisite "agreement" in virtually any manufacturer conduct. The dis-
senting justices in Parke, Davis were of the view that the majority so
limited the Colgate doctrine as to "eviscerate" it and "throw the ... doc-
trine into discard. '50 At most, the Colgate doctrine is said by the courts
to confer only a "limited dispensation" to manufacturer efforts to control
resale prices, 51 and to provide only a "narrow channel through which [the
manufacturer] may pass," a channel so narrow as to be impassable by
any arrangement which is not of "Doric simplicity. '"52
C. Recent Cases on the Colgate Immunity
Although the majority of the commentators suggest that the Colgate
protection is so thin as to be imaginary and that the law today therefore
practically forecloses all forms of vertical price tampering, a number of
manufacturers have successfully negotiated the Colgate "channel." Even
looking at the fractional measure represented by litigated cases, one has
the impression that the rumors of Colgate's death have been greatly ex-
aggerated. Although the cases have not produced any intellectually
coherent doctrine, a brief review of some recent opinions will illustrate
the continuing problem.
A common judicial approach has been to grant Colgate immunity
when there is no evidence of dealer coercion. 53 For example, in United
States v. 0. M. Scott & Sons Co., 54 the manufacturer of lawn care pro-
ducts preticketed them, 55 nationally advertised the retail price, and en-
couraged dealers to refuse to sell to other dealers who might discount the
products. The manufacturer never cut off any dealer even though there
was occasionally some dealer price discounting. In a government suit to
49. See, e.g., L. SuLvAN, supra note 4, at 394; Pitofsky & Dam, Is the Colgate Doctrine
Dead?, 37 ANrrrusr L.J. 772 (1968).
50. 362 U.S. at 57.
51. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953).
52. G. W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 227 F.2d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1960).
53. In an early franchise case, the plaintiff, whose franchise was terminated, testified that he
alone determined the price, in spite of the manufacturer's transmission of price suggestions, thus
negating that the manufacturer conduct was coercive in any way. Engbrecht v. Dairy Queen Co.,
203 F. Supp. 714 (D. Kan. 1962). See also Santa Clara Valley Distrib. Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co.,
556 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1977). In Santa Clara witnesses of the plaintiff-dealer testified at length that
they were never threatened by the manufacturer, that the manufacturer never forced them to comply
with its suggestions as to price, and that they always felt free to charge what they pleased. On that
evidence, a verdict was directed for the defendant manufacturer.
54. 303 F. Supp. 141 (D.D.C. 1969).
55. The word "preticketing" refers to imprinting the manufacturer's suggested resale price on
the package or the product itself, or on an attached tag.
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enjoin Scott, the court held that no dealer was caused "to change his nor-
mal manner of doing business," 56 and that therefore the injunction would
not issue. The court said that to go beyond the limit of Colgate protection
there "must be such [manufacturer conduct] as to induce an acquiescence
in the dealer that is not of his free choice. . . .[There must be] some
element of coercion . . . .57
Coercion may be just another way of characterizing the kind of
relationship between the manufacturer and the dealer which will be held
to be an "agreement" under Parke, Davis. The Ninth Circuit, in Santa
Clara Valley Distributing Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 58 indicated that
without coercion there can be no conspiracy because the notion of con-
spiracy necessarily includes a "plurality" component. Plaintiff had de-
nied entering into any agreement with the defendant to fix prices, and
hence the "plurality" component could be satisfied only by proof of coer-
cion. On its face, of course, this is a bizarre notion of conspiracy but, at
least since Albrecht v. Herald Co., 59 antitrust lawyers have become ac-
customed to the idea that co-conspirators need not be friends; they can be
enemies or even innocent bystanders. 60
Termination of a conspiracy may also insulate the manufacturer from
antitrust liability for cutting off any dealers who were involved in the
original conspiracy. In Dart Drug Corp. v. Parke, Davis & Co. 61 a tre-
ble damage action growing out of the conspiracy established in Parke,
Davis, the dealer complained that its role in calling the manufacturer's
conduct to the attention of the Justice Department and its role in testify-
ing against Parke, Davis in that litigation were the real reasons Parke,
Davis cut it off. The court found, however, that the original conspiracy
had terminated with the consent decree in the Parke, Davis litigation,
and because the plaintiff proved no further conspiratorial behavior after
the date of the decree, summary judgment for defendant was affirmed.
The availability of Colgate protection may also depend upon whether
the manufacturer's attempt to affect resale prices is successful. 62
Schnapps Shop, Inc. v. H. W. Wright & Co., 63 a case involving two
56. 303 F. Supp. at 154.
57. Id. at 153.
58. 556 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1977). See note 53 supra.
59. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
60. Id. at 150 n.6.
61. 344 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
62. If the degree of success is persuasive to an antitrust court evaluating a suggested price pro-
gram, another difference between the horizontal and vertical price fixing doctrines appears. In hori-
zontal cases, whether the price fixers have any effect or even the power necessary for potential effect
are both, by conventional analysis, irrelevant to the condemnation of the conduct. See L. SULLIVAN,
supra note 4, at 198.
63. 377 F. Supp. 570 (D. Md. 1973).
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manufacturers, one held to be within the Colgate protection and the other
not, illustrates the subtlety of this analysis. Universal and Wright sold li-
quor to the plaintiff, Schnapps. Both manufacturers published suggested
list prices, discouraged dealers from price cutting, obtained information
that plaintiff sold its product at less than the suggested price, "requested"
that Schnapps alter its policies and ultimately refused to -sell to it.
Schnapps then brought an antitrust action against both suppliers under
section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Universal's conduct, said the court, did not violate the antitrust laws
because there was no agreement; the court seemed to use the word
"agreement" in its consensual or contractual sense. At most, Universal's
actions were "preliminaries to solicitation of agreements by retailers to
maintain a united advertised-price front. '"64 Alternatively, Universal may
have "invited concerted action." But more than solicitations and invita-
tions are needed; "[w]ithout the crucial steps of invitation and accep-
tance, no conspiracy . . . exists." 65
Wright, however, was held to have gone beyond the protection of Col-
gate. The court observed that, unlike Universal, Wright had been very
successful in controlling retail prices. Of some 4,000 dealers subjected to
Wright's entreaties, all but about ten complied with the pricing
suggestions. Although the court said that success itself would not prove a
conspiracy, the conclusion is almost irresistible that the court found in
the widespread compliance with Wright's suggestions the "acceptance"
of the supplier's "invitation" needed to establish the conspiracy.
The manufacturer may also prevail because of failures of proof. Given
the uncertain nature of the doctrine in this area, the credibility of evi-
dence is critical. 66 In Garretts, Inc. v. Farrah Mfg. Co. ,67 the plaintiff,
64. Id. at 576.
65. Id.
66. The quantum of proof required will of course vary with the standard the court applies to
determine whether Colgate protection is available to the defendant. Klein v. American Luggage
Works, Inc., 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963), illustrates the difficulty of predicting how freely a court
will infer an agreement or conspiracy from sketchy or conflicting evidence. The district court found
evidence that the manufacturer informed dealers of the plan to support prices and that the dealers
adhered to the plan. The evidence also showed that the manufacturer's product was preticketed, that
the manufacturer's salesmen told dealers that compliance with price suggestions was mandatory, and
that retailers agreed to this, in part responding to a volume of manufacturer literature and other com-
munications during the negotiation for a sale to the dealers. The district court found the necessary
agreement, applying the Interstate Circuit formula (Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208
(1939)) to the effect that an actual agreement is not necessary for the offense if concerted action was
contemplated and invited and defendant's conduct appeared responsive to the invitation. The court
of appeals reversed on the ground that the finding below was unsupported by the record. The record
showed only that the manufacturer "advised" the dealers as to its preference, and this was within
Colgate protection. The court of appeals expressly denied that the Interstate Circuit formula could
apply on these facts.
67. 412 F. Supp. 656 (D.S.C. 1976).
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cut off by the defendant manufacturer for discounting the defendant's
product, chose a nonjury trial. His witnesses stated that there were
threats by the defendant, contacts between the defendant's salesmen and
the plaintiff's employees, and contacts between the defendant and other
retailers. The defendant's witnesses stated that after noticing the plain-
tiff's price cutting behavior, they strictly avoided the plaintiff, said noth-
ing to him, simply stopped calling on him and refused further dealing.
Among the defendant's witnesses were other retailers who testified that
the defendant never put any pressure on them to maintain retail prices.
The district court judge believed the defendant's witness. The judge con-
ceded that the Colgate channel was a narrow one; nevertheless, he said.
"the credible evidence presented shows that defendant has charted and
sailed a course simple enough to negotiate it successfully. "
68
A manufacturer may also navigate the Colgate channel by reducing
the directness of the price control. In Engbrecht v. Dairy Queen Co. 69
for example, the manufacturer disseminated information locally and na-
tionally about the price at which one could buy its products in its own
retail outlets. The court found this to be within the Colgate protection. In
United States v. UniRoyal70 the court refused to hold a manufacturer li-
able for the sporadic and isolated acts of its salesmen who, contrary to
company policy, may have individually crossed the Colgate line.
Finally, with doctrine so unclear and the vagaries of proof so great,
there is perhaps more room than usual for the play of the fact-finder's
own bias. A court is not likely to be generous in evaluating the elements
of an antitrust case in favor of a plaintiff appearing to the court as one
who, "like many another loser in the competitive endeavor, . . . decided
to try the antitrust laws as a means of shifting his loss to someone else."-
7
'
III. THE CASE AGAINST SUGGESTED RESALE PRICES
The foregoing discussion illustrates a number of means by which the
Colgate channel has been successfully navigated. The result is that de-
spite the per se rule against price fixing, vertical price tampering is per-
mitted in broad ranges when it takes the form of manufacturer sugges-
tions enforced by refusals to deal. Thus, to the extent that protection for
68. Id. at 665. The judge's preference for defendant's witnesses was based in part on the fact
that in the eyes of the judge they were not interested, while plaintiff's witnesses were. One wonders,
however, how objective plaintiff's competitors were, when called by defendant to establish that the
defendant had lawfully eliminated one of their most troublesome competitors.
69. 203 F. Supp. 714 (D. Kan. 1962).
70. 300 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).




such conduct is available under the Colgate doctrine, the accepted
antitrust policy against vertical price fixing is frustrated. The remainder
of this article argues that the Colgate rule should be modified at least to
the point of making suggested prices presumptively illegal. Fuller en-
forcement of the ban on vertical price fixing would generate doctrinal
clarity and predictability and is in the interest of a general strengthening
of competition.
A. The Value of Doctrinal Clarity
The cases illustrate that whether a manufacturer's conduct has crossed
the line of Colgate immunity often depends upon a court characterizing
otherwise unilateral conduct as an agreement. The doctrine is obscure be-
cause the notion of agreement has taken on an artificial meaning. Al-
though a manufacturer price suggestion, followed by acquiescence on the
part of the dealer, could be considered an agreement in a conventional
sense, 72 the doctrine requires that that notion be rejected while allowing
the courts to go on and find the necessary agreement in conduct wholly
without consensual content. As the preceding discussion illustrates,
courts can find an agreement when the manufacturer listens to complaints
from other retailers about plaintiff's price cutting, 73 urges the price-cut-
ting dealer to hold the line on prices, 74 or explains his pricing preferences
in repeated or enthusiastic terms. 75 This conduct, of course, adds nothing
consensual to the transaction. The result is an unwelcome doctrinal ob-
scurity. The language is further strained when the victim of the conspir-
acy is held to be a co-conspirator, or innocent third parties are said
unknowingly to make conspiratorial what would otherwise be unila-
teral. 76
Linguistic purity is not the ultimate objective of a legal system, of
course; definitional conventions should not be allowed to impede the so-
lution of problems. But straying from convention does carry some risk of
artificiality and imprecision in doctrine, which in turn may impede prin-
cipled decision making and reduce predictability. Altering the normal
consensual meaning of "contract, combination, or conspiracy," has for
example, caused liability in this area to turn on such matters as the vigor
72. "[I]t should be... clear... that a policy of refusing to deal with price cutters is no more
nor less than an invitation to agree on resale price which, if it produces the desired acquiescence
... results in... agreements." Turner, supra note 19, at 689.
73. See Schnapps Shop, Inc. v. H. W. Wright & Co., 377 F. Supp. 570 (D. Md. 1973).
74. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
75. See Coors v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974).
76. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
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with which a manufacturer happens to phrase his suggestions, the care-
less remark of a visiting salesman, or the degree to which dealers find it
in their interest to go along with manufacturer suggestions. The resulting
area of proscribed conduct is not explicable by reference to any of the
understood purposes of the antitrust laws, and labeling the conduct an
agreement does not remedy this deficiency. If the antitrust laws are to
discourage coercion, vigor, and carelessness the issue should be ad-
dressed head-on, not decided by the shape of an incidental remnant of the
Colgate doctrine. Failure to deal with the problem directly has produced
doctrine which inexactly implements the purposes of the antitrust laws,
contorts the statutory language, and fails to identify the area of pros-
cribed conduct intelligibly.
Predicting liability in this area is now extremely difficult. The counsel-
ing which appears in print is appropriately cautious in suggesting that
manufacturers are unable to do much to establish the retail prices of their
products. 77 The practice of suggesting prices continues, however. It may
be that actual counseling is carrying a different message or that the manu-
facturers themselves find enough ambiguity in the doctrine and enough
uncertainty in the cases to make suggesting prices appear to be worth the
gamble. Whatever the case, a more predictive doctrine would facilitate
rational counseling.
Finally, current vertical price-fixing doctrine violates the ancient and
sensible maxim that courts should not permit the parties to do indirectly
what the law forbids doing directly. Dr. Miles prohibits the vertical fix-
ing of resale prices, but Colgate permits the manufacturer to suggest a
price and to punish the dealer who will not comply with it by refusing to
sell to that dealer. If the Dr. Miles policy against vertical price fixing is
sound, and most agree that it is, 78 circumventing that policy by indirect
Colgate-approved conduct should not be allowed. It is true that the line
of cases including Parke, Davis, with their expanded notion of agree-
ment, curtails somewhat this circumvention of the Dr. Miles policy. As
has been indicated, however, the drawbacks of this indirect solution
leave the antitrust doctrine unsound, analytically confused, and unpred-
ictable. The Colgate problem should be squarely faced and the doctrine
explicitly revised unless it has significant practical justifications or unless
suitable alternatives cannot be fashioned.
77. See, e.g., C. HILLS, ANniRusr ADVISER § 232 (2d ed. 1978); E. ROCKEFELLER, ANnrRusT
QUESnONS AND ANSWERS 110 (1974).
78. It is not strictly accurate to say that all agree with the Dr. Miles proscription of vertical price
fixing. See R. BORK, ANrnwtusr PARADOX 288-91 (1978). But the weight of the commentary and the





B. The Competitive Effects of Suggested Resale Prices
Two justifications for the different practical treatment of vertical and
horizontal price fixing usually are advanced. First, there are said to be
benefits of vertical price restrictions which do not exist in the case of hor-
izontal restrictions and which therefore warrant some judicial generosity.
Second, the potential harms of price restraints between vertically related
parties are said to be less than the harms associated with horizontal price
restraints.
1. Benefits
The existence and extent of benefits flowing from vertical price re-
straints generally are the subject of considerable debate. In Dr. Miles,
Justice Hughes doubted that there was significant manufacturer interest
in formal resale price fixing: "[T]he advantage of established retail prices
primarily concerns the dealers. The enlarged profits which would result
from adherence to the established rates would go to them and not to the
[manufacturer]. ' 79 A substantial controversy has broken out since that
time over whether manufacturers have significant and legitimate interests
in controlling resale prices. The literature contains several lists of as-
serted advantages and there is no need to detail them here.
80
A central theme of the literature is the recognition that the manufac-
turer must pay to have its product distributed and marketed and if it
chooses to have those functions performed by persons outside the firm it
must pay what is necessary to induce the appropriate kind and degree of
marketing efforts. When, for example, successful promotion and market-
ing of a product requires such things as demonstrations, advertising, or
warranty service, someone must be induced to perform those services.
When the manufacturer fixes the retail price it frees the dealer from intra-
brand competition, presumably permitting the dealer to charge a some-
what higher price for the product. The extra returns compensate the
dealer for additional services performed. It is said that since fixed resale
prices make intrabrand price competition impossible, dealers channel
their competitive energies into service competition, thus guaranteeing the
79. 220 U.S. at 407.
80. See, e.g., the tabulations of manufacturer benefits in R. PosNER, AmNrrRusr LAW: AN Eco-
NoW~c PEaspacnvE 147-51 (1976); F. SHERER, INDUsTrIAL MARKEr STRucruRE 513-15 (1970); L. SUL-
uvAN, supra note 4, at 380; Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept, 75 YALE L.J. 373,
453 (1966); Louis, Vertical Distributional Restraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania: An Argumentfor
the Continuing Use of a Partial Per Se Approach, 75 MICH. L. REv. 275, 296-306 (1976); Tester,




manufacturer needed marketing functions. Viewed from a slightly differ-
ent angle, some manufacturer control of resale prices is said to be needed
because of the "free rider" problem: the dealer cannot be expected to
offer elaborate and expensive demonstrations of a product if the cus-
tomer-having made his selection by reason of the dealer's demon-
stration-actually buys the product from a discount house which is able
to undercut the dealer's price because it does not bear the expense of de-
monstrating the product.
Another manufacturer justification for control of resale prices is said to
lie in capturing scale economies in advertising, for example, stabilizing
the retail price of the product so that a manufacturer can take advantage
of national advertising programs. 81
It is sometimes said that the elimination of intrabrand competition fa-
cilitates the promotion of products which are new or have small market
shares, leading to increased interbrand competition. It is also suggested
that a manufacturer may be confronted with a cartel at the retail level
which is pricing its products too high for maximum manufacturer profit.
By having control over resale price, a manufacturer could impose a maxi-
mum retail price and thus protect the consumer from price gouging on
the part of local cartels or monopolies. 82
Other motives or explanations for resale price maintenance are offered
but do not appear to generate benefits that would be weighted favorably
from an antitrust standpoint. Some of these are essentially neutral from
the antitrust perspective, such as the notion that manufacturer control of
resale price aids the manufacturer in protecting its brand image by reduc-
ing the probability of loss-leader pricing. 83 Still other suggested motives
are actually antithetical to antitrust concerns, such as the justification that
the manufacturer, more than the retailer, knows the real shape of the con-
sumer demand curve or the real composition of dealers' costs and there-
fore is better able to establish the appropriate price. Although super-
ficially appealing, in some settings general manufacturer control of retail
prices is likely to undercut important competitive values and to produce
rigidity and unresponsiveness in retail pricing. 84 The same may be said
for the suggestion that control of resale price gives the manufacturer con-
trol over the entire distribution system, including the important choices
of who, where and how its product will be marketed. 85 It is said that
81. See Bork, supra note 80, at 460.
82. Id. at 464.
83. P. AREEDA, AerrmusT ANALYSiS 501-02 (2d ed. 1974).
84. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at 381-82, 388.
85. See L. Stem, Approaches to Achieving Retail Price Stability, in CoNcErts FOR MODERN




manufacturers should also be concerned about supporting resale prices
because price competition, if allowed to break out of the retail level, may
well back up into the manufacturer level as retailers put pressures on
manufacturers to cut wholesale prices. 86 That, of course, would be pre-
cisely the hoped-for outcome of significant competitive pressure at the
retail level. Finally, there is little doubt that manufacturer control of re-
sale prices can facilitate cartels at the manufacturer levels, an outcome
which would run directly counter to a central policy of the antitrust
laws.87 This may occur in a variety of ways, as for example, when the
existence of uniform resale prices makes manufacturer "cheating" more
visible to the other members of the cartel, or when the existence of a
fixed resale price removes the motivation for manufacturer price compe-
tition. 88
Most of the asserted justifications for manufacturer control of resale
prices draw strength from the supposition that the interest of the manu-
facturer in retail prices is nearer to that of the consumer and is usually
contrary to the interest of the retail dealer. When price-affecting conduct
takes place between horizontal competitors, there is no reason to believe
much is involved other than the suppression of competition, which
carries a heavy cost in terms of the consumer interest. Horizontal
competitors will generally prefer higher rather than lower dealer profits.
But at any fixed manufacturer selling price, it would seem to be in the
interest of the manufacturer that the dealer's markup be as low as possi-
ble in order that the retail price be minimized. This insures that the maxi-
mum number of units will be sold to consumers, and the greater the num-
ber sold, the greater will be the manufacturer's revenues. Because
minimizing dealer profits is in the interest of the consumer as well as the
manufacturer, it is argued that permitting the manufacturer to impose
some price-affecting restraints on dealers does not significantly threaten
consumer interests.89
Whether vertical restrictions of these kinds are always so innocent has
been questioned. 90 The model described above may have a real world
counterpart when the manufacturer is a monopolist. When the manufac-
turer itself faces competition at the manufacturer level, however, there
may be incentive to increase dealer profits in the hope of inducing dealer
86. Id. at 192.
87. See FTC REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE lxii (1945); Tester, supra note 2, at
96-104; R. BORK, supra note 78, at 293 (stating view that the problem is not a substantial one); F.
SHERE., supra note 80, at 512-15.
88. See Tester, supra note 2, at 96-99.
89. See L. SuwvAN, supra note 4, at 380.
90. Id. at 411-21.
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conduct aimed at creating consumer preferences for the manufacturer's
product. 91 If additional dealer promotion induced by higher markups in
fact increases the number of sales, the manufacturer and the dealer may
both gain; it is not obvious that the consumer is benefited. 92
Moreover, it should be obvious that one cannot justify a manufacturer-
imposed minimum price on any theory that the manufacturer is more in-
terested than the dealer in the lowest possible price. Wherever the manu-
facturer feels the need to prevent the dealer from lowering the retail
price, the consumer is presumably better off with the dealer's price
preference.
Another difficulty with the general justification for vertical restraints
is that it tends to overlook the effect of such restraints on the manufac-
turer's market power. Vertical restraints are principally aimed at increas-
ing market power of the products involved through product differentia-
tion. It seems likely that the objective of most dealer services of the
promotional variety is the differentiation of the manufacturer's product
from that of its competitors. To the extent this effort succeeds, compet-
ing products no longer appear to the consumer as effective substitutes
and interbrand competition becomes less effective: the product's price in-
creases may be made without fear of significant loss of trade.
There is considerable incentive ... for firms to differentiate their products
from those of their rivals precisely for the purpose of promoting low con-
sumer substitutability, thereby insulating themselves from the effects of
price competition.
[In consequence, the] manufacturer and the dealer are both likely to bene-
fit-at the consumer's expense-from the high dealer markups required for
product differentiation .
I . . in the end, vertical restrictions not only will eliminate intrabrand
competition but also, through their effect on product differentiation, will
serve to restrict price competition among the products of different firms. 93
When one turns from the general justifications for vertical price re-
straints to inquire into the likely effects of the particular form of price
restriction under review here-suggested resale prices-the benefits
analysis grows even more attenuated. As has been indicated above, 94 the
Sylvania opinion has relaxed the rigid rule regarding nonprice vertical re-
straints, in part because of a perception that such restraints may involve
91. Comanor, supra note 5, at 1425.
92. Id. at 1426.
93. Id. at 1423, 1426-27.




benefits to competition. Most would agree that any benefits derived from
vertical nonprice restraints are primarily due to the manufacturer's ability
to insist on the restraint. That is, it is the manufacturer's ability to force
dealers to stay within certain territorial limits or to sell only to certain
customer classes which assures other dealers of freedom from intrabrand
competition. In turn, that freedom is said to induce the additional promo-
tional activity which benefits the manufacturer. 95 A system of "volun-
tary" territorial assignments, or "suggested" customer limitations,
however, will not ensure any benefit to the manufacturer. For this rea-
son, few if any manufacturer benefits could ever be traced to a system of
"suggested" list prices. Suggested prices do not guarantee dealer freedom
from intrabrand competition. That freedom arises only when other retail-
ers decide that it is in their interest to comply with the price suggestion.
Manufacturer benefits bought at such a cost to competition are, it is
argued below, far too expensive. In short, it is very difficult to distin-
guish this situation from price tampering in the horizontal context when
the obvious harms to the consumer outweigh any conceivable benefits to
competition.
2. Harms
If the claimed benefits of suggested prices are speculative or costly,
any justification of them must show that the harms involved are minimal.
In addition to the potential harms of vertical restraints generally, as re-
viewed above, and to the special harms at the manufacturer level which
have been suggested, the most obvious competitive costs of the practice
of suggesting prices are paid in terms of reduced competition at the retail
level. As was clear to Justice Hughes as early as 1911,96 the practice of
resale price maintenance can substantially eliminate price competition
among the retail sellers of the product in question. This conclusion is
challenged by those who feel that the consumer is not harmed by the
elimination of intrabrand competition if there is sufficient interbrand
competition present in the market. For example, the manufacturer of
XYZ television sets, desiring to encourage dealers to provide more com-
fortable showrooms, more elaborate demonstrations, or improved war-
ranty service, may impose price restraints on its dealers; all XYZ televi-
sion sets of any given model will henceforth sell at the same price. The
95. The conventional assertions that vertical restrictions have the effect of producing a level of
dealer services desired by the manufacturers have been criticized. E.g., Comanor, supra note 5, at
1432-33; Comment, The Legal and Economic Status of Vertical Restrictions, 23 ViLL. L. REv. 547,
562 (1978).
96. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
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consumer is obviously deprived of price competition among XYZ
dealers, but, it is argued, the consumer is not hurt by this arrangement if
there are substitute brands available because that availability means that
XYZ prices cannot be much above the competitive level for television
sets, including the cost of the additional services calculated at their value
to the consumer. If XYZ's price were higher, by definition XYZ would
lose trade to competing brands. The price restraint, then, far from being
harmful to the consumer, instead makes available to him additional ser-
vices should he desire them.
This line of reasoning is unpersuasive for three reasons. First, no one
believes the argument justifies comparable horizontal arrangements. Sec-
ond, interbrand competition is not an adequate substitute for intrabrand
competition. And, third, arrangements eliminating intrabrand competi-
tion too likely facilitate the operation of a dealer cartel or, at least,
facilitate cartelization if it has not already occurred.
If enhancing interbrand competition were an adequate justification for
eliminating intrabrand competition, horizontal arrangements for this pur-
pose should be allowed. No one, however, has argued that horizontally
related dealers of a single brand should be allowed to combine to set
prices for that brand on the theory that only intrabrand competition is af-
fected. 97 If all the Plymouth dealers in town wanted to agree on the price
of the various models of that automobile, the arrangement would be con-
demned absolutely. The dealers could not justify their conduct by saying
that so long as Chevrolets are available to the consumer there will be no
harm in permitting Plymouth dealers to agree on Plymouth prices.9 8
Even conceding, for the sake of argument, the validity of the sugges-
tion that consumer welfare is more protected when the manufacturer sets
prices than when prices are set by horizontal competitors, 99 the example
of the Plymouth dealer cartel indicates the limits of the protection by
illustrating the second, more fundamental failure of the argument that the
consumer is adequately protected by the existence of interbrand competi-
tion. Interbrand competition is not an adequate substitute for the intra-
brand competition eliminated. Manufacturers will not attempt to fix re-
sale prices unless there is some market power in the brand whose price is
being fixed. If there is no market power in the brand, that is, if there are
perfect substitutes in the market, the elimination of intrabrand
competition by controlling resale prices would be pointless. Any effort
97. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Sealy. Inc..
388 U.S. 350 (1967); Plymouth Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 279 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1960).
98. See Plymouth Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 279 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1960).
99. See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
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by the dealer to raise its price above that of other brands would suffer a
loss of business to those brands.100 Accordingly, whenever manulfactur-
ers attempt to control resale prices, one can assume that there is sufficient
market power in the brand to support trade at the higher prices. And
when market power exists for a given brand, intrabrand competition is
important. In short, the manufacturer's justification for vertical restraints
assumes the existence of perfectly substitutable products, which is most
unlikely in the typical setting in which vertical restraints are appealing.
Market power is often generated by the manufacturers themselves.
Auto makers, for example, spend vast sums to differentiate their pro-
ducts. The result is that Chevrolets and Plymouths are not fully substitut-
able. The consumer who has become persuaded, perhaps as a result of
manufacturer advertising, that Plymouth is the only brand to buy should
have the benefit of competition among Plymouth dealers. A manufac-
turer claim of the right to reduce competition among its dealers because
the consumer is not harmed so long as differentiated products are
available has a hollow and unpersuasive ring. 101
The third problem with vertical arrangements to set prices is that they
are very likely to be integral to the operation or formation of a dealer car-
tel. It is said that vertical price restraints are valuable because they induce
dealers to finance additional promotional and other point-of-sale services
which are important to the manufacturer's marketing strategy. This in-
ducement depends upon two circumstances. 102 First, it is necessary that
the price suggested by the manufacturer is above that which would be set
by the forces of the competitive market. If the manufacturer set a price
below the market, of course, no dealer would comply. Second, even
though the price suggested is attractive, no dealer will willingly adopt it
unless he expects his competitors also to conform. The expectation of
general compliance among dealers is thus the second necessary condi-
tion. In a form of the familiar "recognized interdependence" phenome-
non, 10 3 dealers may recognize that they are better off if all conform to the
100. For a technical explanation of this notion, see E. DouGLAs, ECONOMtCs OF MARKEnNG 208
(1975).
101. "[Intrabrand competition] may often be vital to the consumer, especially in industries
where products are so highly differentiated that a particular brand often has a market of its own." R.
Favretto, Vertical Restraints and Other Current Distribution Issues in the Wake of Sylvania 9 (Re-
marks at Southwestern Legal Foundation Symposium on Antitrust Law in Dallas, Texas, May 12,
1978). See also F. SHaaM, supra note 80, at 515; L. SutuvAN, supra note 4, at 379; Zimmerman,
Distribution Restrictions After Sealy and Schwinn, 12 ANmrMusr Buu. 1181, 1185 (1967).
102. See Comment, Refusal to Sell: A Means of Achieving Resale Price Maintenance in Non-
Fair-Trade States, 36 TEx. L. Ray. 799 (1958).




manufacturer's supracompetitive price suggestions. The pricing conduct
thus rests on an explicit or tacit understanding among horizontal competi-
tors which, if directly achieved, would be condemned. 104
The cartelization process is greatly facilitated by manufacturer sug-
gested price systems. There is little doubt that whenever some retailer
interest in price stability is present, any kind of target price will facilitate
the achievement of that stability. "Focal point" pricing, "bench mark"
pricing, price signalling, or other facilitating devices can have significant
effects on retail price uniformity. 105 If such subtle measures can produce
unnecessarily stable retail prices, discrete and specific price information
printed directly on a label or package or appearing in an advertisement
certainly can have the same effect. When overt communication would be
legally risky, suggested prices and preticketing would be an ideal solu-
tion for retailers looking for an effective means of "coordinating" their
actions for their mutual benefit. 106
A manufacturer-generated price target may have the identical effect of
one generated by a retailer association and retailer tampering with price
is everywhere condemned. Circulation among retailers of pricing
"guides" was characterized as price fixing and held to violate the Sher-
man Act in United States v. Nationwide Trailer Rental System, Inc. 107
Distribution of a dealers' association "suggested price" was held unlaw-
ful in Plymouth Dealers' Association v. United States10 8 even though
dealers were not committed to and many did not follow the suggested
prices. Competitors cannot safely set a time at which prices are to be in-
dividually set, 109 establish a functional discount rate I 0 or an advertising
policy,"' or determine jointly the composition of the industry's pro-
duct, 112 even though none of these practices can be said to have any nec-
essary effect on actual prices. To make this sort of conduct a per se
violation it is enough, in the classic formulation in United States v. So-
104. See note 26 supra.
105. See Blechman, Conscious Parallelism, Signalling and Facilitating Devices: The Problem
of Tacit Collusion Under the Antitrust Laws, 24 N.Y.L. Rev. 881, 901-03 (1979); Kuhlman, Price
Fixing, Nonprice Competition and 'Focal Point' Pricing: A Rose by Any Other Name, 10 ANmW'ST
L. & EcoN. REv. 75 (1978). The Federal Trade Commission has recently commenced a proceeding
against manufacturers of gasoline additives in part based on price signalling. TRADE REG. REPORrs
(CCH) No. 388, at 1 (June 5, 1979).
106. See Kuhlman, supra note 105.
107. 156 F. Supp. 800 (D. Kan.), affdper curiam, 355 U.S. 10 (1957).
108. 279 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1960).
109. United States v. Jantzen Inc., [1966] Trade Cas. (CCH) 83, 110 (D. Ore.)
110. United States v. United Liquors Corp., 149 F. Supp. 609 (W.D. Tenn. 1956), afj'd, 352
U.S. 991 (1957).
111. United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, 285 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1961).




cony Vacuum Oil Co., 113 that the conduct has the purpose or effect of
"raising, depressing, fixing, pegging or stabilizing" prices.
In addition to the harmful effects on horizontal competition, the histor-
ical record supports the idea that there may be anticompetitive purposes
as well. The most developed literature concerning the purposes behind
manufacturer control of retail prices is in the fair trade area. The history
of that area reveals that resale price maintenance under the fair trade laws
was virtually everywhere retailer inspired.114 After a review of the his-
tory, Professor Bowman says:
The foregoing examples suggest that resale price maintenance is a method
used by organized dealers to force unwilling manufacturers to work for
them to protect dealer profit margins....
The pressure and the moral force of the [retailer] association is responsi-
ble more than any other single factor for whatever price maintenance we
have .... 115
Large retailer organizations mounted massive lobbying efforts which se-
cured the enactment of fair trade laws in many states, and manufacturers
who fought this movement ultimately had to reckon with retailer retalia-
tion. 116
The history of the fair trade laws also makes it relatively clear that
once those laws were adopted, the manufacturing component of the mar-
keting system was enlisted as an enforcement agency to further programs
in the interest of retail dealers. In reviewing the variety of devices by
which retail associations could police their own cartels, Professor Hol-
lander says a common finding is "pressure or persuasion on an outside
agency to enforce the group program. This is why so many retailer price
arrangements become vertical plans, with the suppliers placed in the role
of enforcement agency." 117
In summary, the retail level effects of suggested prices are serious.
Their widespread use signals significant market power in the brand in-
volved as well as a common perception among horizontal competitors
that they will benefit by jointly following the manufacturer's sugges-
tions. The sort of parallel behavior which results from perceived interde-
113. 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
114. S. HOLLANDER, RSRAIrNs UPON RErAIL COMPETmON 48-70 (1965); R. LYNN, PRICE POLICIES
AND MARKEmrN MANAOEMENr 271 (1967); L. SuuavAN, supra note 4, at 383; Bowman, The Prereq-
uisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 CI. L. R v. 825, 849 (1955).
115. Bowman, supra note 114, at 830-31 (quoting FrC, REPoRTON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
(1945)).
116. An example of retailer retaliation against a reluctant manufacturer is given in R. LYNN,
supra note 114, at 271.
117. S. Hou.LaR, supra note 114, at 70.
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pendence among horizontal competitors has not yet been effectively con-
demned by the antitrust laws because of the difficulty of devising an
effective remedy." 8 In the vertical setting, however, this problem does
not exist; manufacturer price suggestions can simply be prohibited.
C. Achieving Vertical "Benefits" at Lower Competitive Cost
An analysis of the benefits of suggested prices indicates that there are
seldom significant benefits to competition that cannot be achieved with
less restrictive alternatives. For example, if a manufacturer believes that
some national advertising is important to promote its product and that the
ads must carry some price information, he can refer to the price gener-
ally119 or to a maximum price. ' 2 0 This still gives the dealers a target, yet
it is not so clearly a minimum target; the Department of Justice has indi-
cated that the competitive harms may be less than those of suggested
prices. 121
The manufacturer who believes that its product is best presented at a
specific price, and thus to a specific market, may be able to respond to
the discounting problem by developing different product lines for differ-
ent markets. The makers of Samsonite luggage, for example, market one
line through full price outlets and a second line through discounters. 122
The manufacturer who feels that consumer goodwill is maximized by
careful point-of-sale explanation of the uses of the product may achieve
some of the same benefits by improving labeling and product litera-
ture. 123 Another technique is for the manufacturer to pay the dealer di-
rectly for point-of-sales services. With some product lines, for example,
dealers willing to provide certain services such as promotion and adver-
tising may be paid directly for the service. 124
Sometimes the product and the service can be priced separately so as
to minimize the free-rider problem. If separate pricing is feasible, and if
consumers really desire and are willing to pay for a particular service,
independent parties may arise to provide it.125 It is worth noting that
separate pricing of the service produces additional benefits in consumer
118. See Turner, supra note 19.
119. E.g., "About $40."
120. E.g., "Less than $40."
121. R. Favretto, supra note 101, at 23-24.
122. BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 27, 1965, at 98.
123. See United States v. O.M. Scott & Sons Co., 303 F. Supp. 141 (D.D.C. 1969); text ac-
companying notes 54-57 supra.
124. Comment, supra note 95, at 563.




choice: the consumer can better decide which product he wants-the
phonograph at a low price without credit terms or warranty service, or
the same machine at a higher price with these dealer services.
[A] joint supply arrangement means that consumers are compelled to pur-
chase the entire package; the purchase of dealer services is tied to the pur-
chase of the manufactured product. To the extent that the amounts con-
sumed differ from those which would be chosen in separate markets,
resources are misallocated . . . . This result seems especially apparent in
the case of advertising, for consumers might purchase very little indeed of
this "service" were it provided separately.' 26
The manufacturer who is concerned that its product will not be presented
well unless certain quality control standards are met, such as the appear-
ance of the showroom or the quality of unpacking and "setting up" func-
tions, may choose to sell only through franchised dealers whose contracts
contain minimum quality control requirements. 127
None of these alternatives is, of course, costless. Because these costs
may be passed on to the consumer, it is fair to ask whether the consumer
will receive a net benefit from the adoption of a less restrictive alterna-
tive. The answer cannot be found with any certainty given the state of
our knowledge. According to the view presented in this article there are
significant consumer costs in the existing use of suggested prices.
Perhaps it would be sensible to require persons imposing those costs to
establish that the costs of less restrictive means would be greater.
D. Other Arguments in Favor of Retaining Colgate
Indirect benefits are sometimes said to flow from the Colgate rule. As
indicated earlier, 28 the Colgate Court stated as one of its central proposi-
tions that, absent any intent to achieve an anticompetitive outcome, a
trader must be free to deal with such customers as he chooses. As part of
that freedom, it is said, a manufacturer should retain the right to refuse to
deal with price cutters if it does not wish its product marketed in that
fashion. The Colgate rule protects that freedom by immunizing the man-
ufacturer from antitrust liability for such a refusal to deal. It is feared that
overruling Colgate will result in forcing a manufacturer to sell to dealers
of whose marketing practices it does not approve. 29
126. Id. at 1430.
127. Louis, supra note 10, at 303.
128. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
129. See Levi, supra note 42, at 284-326.
Washington Law Review
A variation of this contention is the suggestion that the Colgate rule
has a useful role in minimizing the use of antitrust litigation as a competi-
tive weapon. Without Colgate protection, it is said, a manufacturer who
chooses to cut off a dealer for even the purest of motives may be sub-
jected to treble damage liability by a disappointed dealer who can
persuade a jury that the cutoff was part of a vertical price-fixing effort.
More likely, the threat of such litigation, because it is time-consuming
and expensive to defend, may encourage a manufacturer to continue sell-
ing to a dealer it no longer wishes to serve. Colgate thus tends to protect
manufacturers from harassment by disappointed dealers. 30
There are several responses to these concerns. First, in Colgate the
Court expressly condemned vertical restraints which had the purpose or
intent of producing anti-competitive results. What we now know about
the real horizontal and vertical relationships involved makes it appear
that virtually all uses of suggested prices have both the purpose and the
effect of damaging competition. Thus, the Colgate rule according to its
own terms can be said to be inapplicable to suggested prices.
Second, it is not unthinkable to impose a duty to deal with all buyers
who meet some threshold of responsibility. Other countries have recog-
nized such duties and there is no overpowering evidence that consumer
welfare has suffered. 13 1 There are many occasions in our law when a
dealer is obliged to accept customers with whom it might rather not deal.
Such occasions are justified whenever society judges total dealer freedom
too costly in terms of other more important values. 132 That would seem
accurately to describe the situation here. The dealer freedom protected by
Colgate costs us a great deal, for its use in the present setting is princi-
pally to facilitate horizontal price fixing. The immunity seems plainly too
costly to society.
No one should be anxious to impose on private industry a public utility
type "duty to serve" or to subject manufacturers to continued harassment
by dealers. But we must recognize the competitive harms that may be
masked by an unlimited privilege to refuse dealing; we must identify the
limits of that privilege which are required to secure the important values
of free competitive markets.
130. P. AREDA, ANITRUsr ANALYSiS 560 (2d ed. 1974).
131. See, e.g., M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY & H. GOLDSCHMID, TRADE REGULATION
611-12 (1975); F. SHERER, supra note 80, at 515-16. One distinguished commentator has even sug-
gested that the vaunted right to sell is an American distortion of the common-law right to buy, which
is the more important privilege if freely competitive markets are the goal. See V. MUND, THE RIGHT
To Buy-AND ITs DENIALTO SMALL BUSINESS, S. Doc. No. 32, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (1957).
132. Legislative enforcement of civil rights is an obvious example. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &




The danger of the antitrust laws being used as a competitive weapon
must also be tolerated in light of the alternative dangers to competition.
Of course, one should create doctrine to minimize such misuses of the
system whenever possible. It has been suggested, for example, that some
of the potential for abuse could be eliminated by requiring a plaintiff to
show something more than an isolated instance of manufacturer price
tampering before he could get by a defendant's motion to dismiss. 133 No
doubt, a careful statement of the rule would minimize risk. Beyond that,
there are many situations in which exposure to some risk is necessary if
the system's underlying objectives are to be met. Indeed, it appears that
in the law of antitrust there is often a risk of misuse of the legal process.
As Mr. Justice Brandeis has observed in a broader connection,
"[l]awsuits.. : often prove to have been groundless; but no way has been
discovered of relieving a defendant from the necessity of a trial to estab-
lish the fact. '134
Finally, the matter of remedy must be addressed. Although the dan-
gers presented by suggested prices in part depend on the sort of "tacit
collusion" or consciously parallel conduct that is often thought to be be-
yond the practical reach of a judicial decree, 135 in its present embodiment
the collusion presents no special problems of remedy. The collusion here
flows from an objective act-that of suggesting a resale price. A decree
forbidding that conduct will effectively eliminate the collusion.
IV. CONCLUSION
Dealers either follow suggested resale prices or they do not. When
they do not, no one benefits; the only effect is to create the illusion that
the dealer price is something of a discount-a form of consumer fraud
the Federal Trade Commission has sought to eliminate. 136
When dealers do follow manufacturer price suggestions, there are only
three reasons to explain the conduct. First, dealers may follow because of
manufacturer coercion. Second, dealers may follow the suggestions be-
cause it is more convenient for them than computing their own cost data
133. Turner, supra note 19, at 690.
134. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1938).
135. A careful statement of this proposition is found in Turner, supra note 19, at 669. Criticism
of the notion may be found in R. Pos~ait, supra note 80, at 74, and L. SuLLivAN, supra note 4, at
363.
136. See FrC Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, 16 C.F.R. §§ 233.1-.5 (1978). See especially




or making their own estimates of consumer demand. Third, dealers may
act as part of a dealer cartel, at least in the de facto sense. None of these
reasons promises significant consumer benefits. All of them imply signif-
icant harm.
The only explanation for the continued existence of the Colgate rule
seems to be the absence of parties for whom litigation would be reward-
ing. If the use of suggested prices is in the interest of the retail dealers
and if the manufacturer desires their goodwill, the only people hurt by
the existence of the prices are consumers who will not be likely to have a
significant enough stake to generate enthusiasm for expensive
litigation. 137 It is relatively clear, too, that the suggested list price prob-
lem appears to have a low spot on the enforcement priority scale of pub-
lic agencies. 38 The Colgate rule does not persist, therefore, because of
any advantages or benefits it provides. Rather, it seems to stand only be-
cause of the absence of an effective challenge. It is time to end the reign
of Colgate either by judicial action or administrative decree.
In many cases the Federal Trade Commission has forbidden the use of
suggested retail prices when a manufacturer has been thought to be
engaged in vertical price fixing. 139 It would not be such a great step to
adopt a rule prohibiting the use of suggested prices generally. It may be
that there are situations in which special justifications exist for vertical
price suggestions, as when significant consumer benefits are demon-
strable, or when the costs of less restrictive alternatives are clearly pro-
hibitive. Further, some freedom from intrabrand competition might result
in stronger interbrand competition when new products or infant dealer
systems are present. 140 To provide for such situations, it would be suffi-
cient to establish only the presumptive illegality of the suggested price.
The manufacturer with a special justification would then have the option
of coming forward with his proof.
The legal doctrine required need not be complex or subtle. There is
quite enough in the most "unilateral" use of suggested prices to satisfy
the requirements of section 1 of the Sherman Act"4 or its Federal Trade
137. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at 399.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Pendleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,571 (July 31.
1979) (consent order); Medalist Industries, Inc., [1973-1976 Transfer Binderl TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) $ 21,098 (1976) (consent order); Cubco, Inc., id. 20,823 (1975) (consent order): Duofold.
Inc., id. 20,773 (1975) (consent order). See also Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC. 497 F. 2d 1178 ( 10th
Cir. 1974).
140. See Comanor, supra note 5, at 1437-38.
141. See Turner, supra note 19, at 689, quoted in note 72 supra.
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Commission Act equivalent. 142 At the core of the present proposal is the
simple concept that, absent manufacturer justification of the sort men-
tioned in the preceding paragraph, vertical price communications should
be judged by the same standards as horizontal price communications.
Such a shift in doctrine would eliminate the Colgate doctrine and in so
doing would bring to the law of vertical price restraints a clarity it has not
known for a number of years.
142. See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 721 n.19 (1948). It is possible that there is
renewed interest in the problem at the FTC. See remarks of Michael Pertschuk, Chairman, FTC,
ABA 1979 Antitrust Section Spring Program, in Washington, D.C. (April 6, 1979), summarized in
TRADE Ro. REPORTs (CCH) No. 380, at 8 (April 9, 1979).
